Saturday, 27, January, 2007 (09, Muharram, 1428)
What Next in Lebanon?
Amir Taheri —
Where do we go from here? This is the question that the leaders of the two rival camps in Lebanon should be pondering in the wake of the showdown that brought Beirut to a standstill last Tuesday.
The showdown started in December, when Hezbollah having withdrawn its ministers from the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, started a mass sit-in in the heart of the Lebanese capital.
The immediate excuse was Siniora’s decision to endorse a United Nation’s enquiry into Syria’s role in the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.
More importantly, perhaps, Hezbollah saw its existence threatened by two United Nations’ Security Council resolutions stipulating that all militias be disarmed. Siniora had accepted both resolutions in the teeth of opposition from Hezbollah that regards its militia as the centerpiece of its power as a state within the Lebanese state. Nevertheless, it is almost certain that other reasons, more broadly related to the balance of power in the region, prompted Hezbollah to make its move.
One reason was Iran’s desire to humiliate the United States by bringing down the Siniora government, often cited by President George W. Bush as a child of the Lebanese “Cedar Revolution” and a symbol of democratization in the Middle East. Creating a pro-Iran government in Beirut would deliver the coup de grace to the “Bush Doctrine” of “spreading freedom.”
Another reason for Hezbollah’s move is the Irano-Syrian desire to use Lebanon as a glacis in war against Israel. As Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallim has said, a neutral Lebanon would deprive Syria of the “hinterland” it needs to deal with a putative Israeli blitzkrieg. The Islamic Republic of Iran also needs Lebanon as a base for “flooding Israel with missiles” as Defense Minister Mostafa Najjar has noted.
Siniora, however, has based his strategy on taking Lebanon out of regional conflicts that have little or nothing to do with its interests as a nation-state. While Hezbollah sees Lebanon as a “bunker” in the global war against the “infidel”, Siniora sees it as a “beach” that could attract the “infidel” to come and spend their money.
Hezbollah that, according to successive local and national elections, represents about 45 percent of the Shiites, has succeeded in finding two valuable allies.
The first is Nabih Berri, the speaker of the National Assembly (Parliament) and the leader of the relatively moderate Shiite movement Amal (Hope). Berri does not share Hezbollah’s apocalyptic vision and, himself a wealthy businessman, sees the logic of Siniora’s strategy of seeking economic development. Berri’s problem is that he is beholden to the Syrian regime that has supported, and financed Amal for three decades. At the same time, Berri does not wish to appear as the man who split the Shiites at a time of rising sectarianism in the region.
The second ally that Hezbollah has secured is Michel Aoun, a pint-size ex-general who played a leading role in the 1975-92 Civil War. Aoun has one ambition: To become president of Lebanon.
In the 1980s, he tried to realize that ambition with the help of Saddam Hussein, who financed the Aounite faction for over a decade. At that time, Syria and Iran were Aoun’s archenemies. This time, with Saddam in no position to help, Aoun has switched to the side of his former foes in the hope of achieving his elusive goal.
Representing at least 40 percent of Lebanon’s population, Hezbollah, Amal and the Aounites know that their alliance can never win a majority in free elections. Their task is further complicated by the sectarian system of government in Lebanon. Under that system, Sunni Muslims have the right to nominate the prime minister while Maronite Christians nominate the president. The right to nominate the speaker of the Parliament goes to the Shiites.
Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, the grand mufti of Lebanon and the principal religious leader of the Sunni community, has given Siniora unequivocal support, dashing Hezbollah’s hopes of triggering a constitutional coup d’etat. The mufti’s message is clear: Shiites and Maronites cannot dictate whom the Sunnis choose as prime minister.
Siniora’s government, however, has a much broader base. It is supported by nearly half of the Christian community, some pro-Arab and anti-Iran Shiite groups, the Druze, and a number of smaller communities. Most observers agree that in a general election the Siniora coalition would win around 60 percent of the votes.
This is why Hezbollah has withdrawn from the political process and taken to the streets. The calculation is that most of Siniora’s supporters are middle class people with no experience of or desire for street politics.
Hezbollah militants, however, are experts in the politics of violence and trained for street fights. Some look forward to martyrdom. Burning cars, setting up street barricades, throwing Molotov cocktails, attacking adversaries with knives and clubs, ransacking government buildings, and, bringing out the guns, when and if necessary, are arts in which Hezbollah excels.
And, yet, almost two months after Hezbollah promised to bring down Siniora’s government in “a matter of days”, the prime minister is still around, as resilient as ever.
He has invited Hezbollah to return to the government, though without the veto that Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Party of God, has demanded. Siniora has also offered early general elections, provided Hezbollah and its Aounite allies let things calm down for a while.
So, where does Lebanon go from here?
Hezbollah’s campaign to destroy the Siniora coalition through street pressure has failed. It has also failed to provoke the national army to get involved in the violence, thus risking disintegration across sectarian lines. To be sure, Hezbollah could continue the confrontation for many weeks, if not months. It has lots of money, mostly from Tehran, and thousands of unemployed youths to man street barricades for $2 a day.
Hezbollah is also using President Emil Lahoud, the man installed and sustained by the Syrians as Lebanon’s head of state, as an irritant against Siniora. Using his constitutional powers, the usurper refuses to sign government edicts, thus paralyzing segments of the administration.
Such a strategy, however, is sure to end in defeat and humiliation. To avoid that, Hezbollah may be forced to do what it has always vowed not to do: Turn its arms against other Lebanese communities. And that could mean another civil war in which Hezbollah may score early victories, but would have little chance of winning in the end. The idea that the major Western powers and their regional Arab allies would allow Lebanon to become an Islamic republic led by Hezbollah, and that against the wishes of a majority of the Lebanese, is simply fanciful.
The only sane way out of the crisis is a grand compromise among the Lebanese communities. Such a compromise could be built on these principles:
— Lebanon should not become involved in any war unless it is directly attacked,
— The current coalition government should be enlarged with the return of the Shiite parties and the inclusion of Aounites, in preparation for general elections within six months,
— Emil Lahoud should resign as president and be replaced by an interim head of state chosen by the Parliament.
— The international community should provide an aid package to keep the Lebanese economy afloat until the political situation is stabilized.
Lebanon is teetering on the edge of the abyss. But it could still step back.
2 comments:
Dear Lebanese,
I appreciate that you post all sides of the debate and are not biased in your blog...it's really what makes it the most readable of all lebanese blogs. To comment on this particular post, my opinion is that Hizballah would never want to be in complete control of lebanon, it has never wanted to and it is not of their manner. However they do need allies in the government to protect their arms and interest in lebanon. this is what it is all about. the problem with Nassrallah now is that he is also a religious leader, so when he promises his people victory over the injustices done upon them, he cant urn back like a politician who can easily change his point of view whenevr he sees it fit. The main problem with lebanon is sicne 60 years ago until now, the Shi'ite people are always being shat on when it comes to economy. when they see siniora bringing nin 7 billion dollars, they cant be happy cause they know its going to northern beritu and lebanon, and that thye will not be seeing any of the flourishing economy in their neighborhoods. but back to the matter at hand, If hizballah itself was a large part of the government, there would be little to fear as they are clean and uncurruted people. however those allied with them (wi2am wahab, michele aoun, sulaiman franjiye, asim anso, talal irslan and so on and so forth) will not be able to benifit lebanon in any way and will just bring it backwards and eventually turn our country into a syrian-eque nation where everyone is poverty stricken and no one wants to visit. I just hope that as soon as the protests began, that siniora had agreed to widen the government to include the Aoun representatives...becuase now if we are to cinsider both sides, there is no real solution. An people like you and me living outside of lebanon want to scream at everyone in there to get their minds back and learn how live and think for themselves and stop following leaders, whoever the hell they may be. that's what was killed with hariri. befor and after hariri the nation was one of leaders (zu3ama) and factions and everyone dying for their party, but during his life inlebanon, we were all part of the same community, we had our leaders, but we weren't making all decisions of life according to them...RIP Rafik...
The following is a critique of Amir Taheri's article. I do not so much criticize his recommendations, as they are clearly in the country's interest, however idealistic they are. However the bulk of the article is filled with inaccuracies and subtle biases that misrepresent the complex situation in Lebanon.
>>What Next in Lebanon?
>>Amir Taheri —
>>
>>
>>Where do we go from here? This is the question that the leaders of the two rival camps in Lebanon should be pondering in the wake of the showdown that brought Beirut to a standstill last Tuesday.
>>
>>The showdown started in December, when Hezbollah having withdrawn its ministers from the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, started a mass sit-in in the heart of the Lebanese capital.
>>
>>The immediate excuse was Siniora’s decision to endorse a United Nation’s enquiry into Syria’s role in the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.
>>
The enquiry had actually been endorsed some time earlier by a unanimous cabinet decision, including those of the pro-Hezbollah ministers. The actual issue in December of 2006 was setting up a court in order to try the people indicted by the enquiry. The immediate excuse as stated by pro-Hezbollah ministers was Siniora's refusal to discuss the draft of the court's bylaws before ratifying it. Hezbollah has consistently stated its support for the court, but demands that the court draft be discussed and modified in the cabinet before ratifying it.
>>More importantly, perhaps, Hezbollah saw its existence threatened by two United Nations’ Security Council resolutions stipulating that all militias be disarmed. Siniora had accepted both resolutions in the teeth of opposition from Hezbollah that regards its militia as the center piece of its power as a state within the Lebanese state. Nevertheless, it is almost certain that other reasons, more broadly related to the balance of power in the region, prompted Hezbollah to make its move.
>>
One must be careful here of the subtleties involved. The UN has passed two resolutions, 1559 and 1701, that call for the disarmament of militias in Lebanon. While several Lebanese cabinets have accepted both resolutions (Siniora was not prime minister when 1559 was adopted), Siniora's cabinet's official ministerial statement has, like all previous Lebanese cabinets, defined Hezbollah's armed wing as a resistance movement and not a militia, and hence outside the scope of the resolutions.
It should also be noted that the phrase 'state within a state' is a highly controversial one in Lebanon and is not Hezbollah's view of itself. Hezbollah would also argue that its power comes from its grass roots support, and not the force of arms.
>>One reason was Iran’s desire to humiliate the United States by bringing down the Siniora government, often cited by President George W. Bush as a child of the Lebanese “Cedar Revolution” and a symbol of democratisation in the Middle East. Creating a pro-Iran government in Beirut would deliver the coup de grace to the “Bush Doctrine” of “spreading freedom.”
>>
>>Another reason for Hezbollah’s move is the Irano-Syrian desire to use Lebanon as a glacis in war against Israel. As Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallim has said, a neutral Lebanon would deprive Syria of the “hinterland” it needs to deal with a putative Israeli blitzkrieg. The Islamic Republic of Iran also needs Lebanon as a base for “flooding Israel with missiles” as Defense Minister Mostafa Najjar has noted.
>>
>>Siniora, however, has based his strategy on taking Lebanon out of regional conflicts that have little or nothing to do with its interests as a nation-state. While Hezbollah sees Lebanon as a “bunker” in the global war against the “infidel”, Siniora sees it as a “beach” that could attract the “infidel” to come and spend their money.
>>
This perspective is very much in line with a neo-conservative reading of the situation. Mr. Taheri also does the inexplicable confusion of coinciding Al Qaeda's motives with that of Hezbollah's. Hezbollah does not see itself in a global war against the infidel, with or without quotation marks. One cannot understand Hezbollah's motives or conduct without recognizing that its power base is derived from a population that had lived under Israeli occupation, with tacit Western support, for 20 years. If Hezbollah wishes to oppose U.S. policy in Lebanon, or maintain an aggressive posture with Israel, it has every reason to do so from purely domestic calculations.
It is also within the U.S.'s stated interests to liquidate Hezbollah, in both its political and armed wing, and re-align Lebanese foreign policy into an anti-Syrian and even pro-Israeli stance. Such a policy cannot be seen by any honest observer as taking Lebanon out of the regional conflict. It is simply a reorientation of the Lebanese dagger in a new direction.
>>Hezbollah that, according to successive local and national elections, represents about 45 percent of the Shiites, has succeeded in finding two valuable allies.
>>
>>The first is Nabih Berri, the speaker of the National Assembly (Parliament) and the leader of the relatively moderate Shiite movement Amal (Hope). Berri does not share Hezbollah’s apocalyptic vision and, himself a wealthy businessman, sees the logic of Siniora’s strategy of seeking economic development. Berri’s problem is that he is beholden to the Syrian regime that has supported, and financed Amal for three decades. At the same time, Berri does not wish to appear as the man who split the Shiites at a time of rising sectarianism in the region.
>>
>>The second ally that Hezbollah has secured is Michel Aoun, a pint-size ex-general who played a leading role in the 1975-92 Civil War. Aoun has one ambition: To become president of Lebanon.
>>
>>In the 1980s, he tried to realize that ambition with the help of Saddam Hussein, who financed the Aounite faction for over a decade. At that time, Syria and Iran were Aoun’s archenemies. This time, with Saddam in no position to help, Aoun has switched to the side of his former foes in the hope of achieving his elusive goal.
>>
>>Representing at least 40 percent of Lebanon’s population, Hezbollah, Amal and the Aounites know that their alliance can never win a majority in free elections. Their task is further complicated by the sectarian system of government in Lebanon. Under that system, Sunni Muslims have the right to nominate the prime minister while Maronite Christians nominate the president. The right to nominate the speaker of the Parliament goes to the Shiites.
>>
>>Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, the grand mufti of Lebanon and the principal religious leader of the Sunni community, has given Siniora unequivocal support, dashing Hezbollah’s hopes of triggering a constitutional coup d’etat. The mufti’s message is clear: Shiites and Maronites cannot dictate whom the Sunnis choose as prime minister.
>>
One cannot reconcile the idea that the opposition realises it can never win a majority in free elections with the fact that the opposition's main demand is for a general election to happen at the earliest opportunity. They do in fact belive they would win a majority in such an election.
It is also very wrong, and in Lebanon a dangerous proposition, to state that each sect nominates its allotted leader. The constitution states that the President must be a Maronite, the Primer Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of the House a Shiite. However, it does not restrict their base of support to any one sect. All three positions have always required a general, though at times grudging, consensus from all sects on who should fill the post. When this has not happened, civil strife is often the result.
During the 2005 elections, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfier was widely criticized for stating 'let the Muslims vote for their candidates, and let the Maronites vote for theirs.' He later clarified, and retracted, the remark. While candidates to certain posts are restricted to a specific sect, they are supposed to represent all Lebanese.
Qabbani's decision to politicise the position of grand mufti is a regretful development. For one, the grand mufti is meant to represent all Muslims of Lebanon, and not the just Sunnis. Regardless of their personal views, Lebanese religious leader have always avoided conflating religious fealty with loyalty to one political current.
>>Siniora’s government, however, has a much broader base. It is supported by nearly half of the Christian community, some pro-Arab and anti-Iran Shiite groups, the Druze, and a number of smaller communities. Most observers agree that in a general election the Siniora coalition would win around 60 percent of the votes.
>>
>>This is why Hezbollah has withdrawn from the political process and taken to the streets. The calculation is that most of Siniora’s supporters are middle class people with no experience of or desire for street politics.
>>
Again, it is not at all certain that Siniora would fare so well in a general election. The opposition's call for early elections and Siniora's refusal to do so, actually makes observers feel the outcome would go the other way. The opposition's massive demonstration in December, being the largest in Lebanese history, underscores this point. Hezbollah's move to the streets was to call for early elections, and not to effect change undemocratically.
>>Hezbollah militants, however, are experts in the politics of violence and trained for street fights. Some look forward to martyrdom. Burning cars, setting up street barricades, throwing Molotov cocktails, attacking adversaries with knives and clubs, ransacking government buildings, and, bringing out the guns, when and if necessary, are arts in which Hezbollah excels.
>>
The above paragraph is an attempt to paint Hezbollah as a group of street thugs and hooligans par excellance. Hezbollah has shown its military might on battlefields against the Israeli army. It surprised everyone by using soldiers well trained in guerrilla tactics and warfare. It has not shown a propensity for street fighting or ransacking government buildings.
The Molotov cocktails, the knives, the clubs, the guns that occurred on Tuesday actually did not involve any of Hezbollah's supporters. The scenes of chaos we witnessed happened mostly in the North between rival Christian parties. In Beirut, it was between the supporters of Siniora and Amal. It is also a glaring bias to portray the Tuesday clashes as a Hezbollah attach on a peaceful population. They were in fact confrontations between pro- and anti-government supporters, with small arms on both sides.
>>And, yet, almost two months after Hezbollah promised to bring down Siniora’s government in “a matter of days”, the prime minister is still around, as resilient as ever.
>>
>>He has invited Hezbollah to return to the government, though without the veto that Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Party of God, has demanded. Siniora has also offered early general elections, provided Hezbollah and its Aounite allies let things calm down for a while.
>>
While Siniora has invited Hezbollah to return to the government, he has specifically refused to hold early general elections. He reiterated this stand on Thursday after further clashes.
>>So, where does Lebanon go from here?
>>
>>Hezbollah’s campaign to destroy the Siniora coalition through street pressure has failed. It has also failed to provoke the national army to get involved in the violence, thus risking disintegration across sectarian lines. To be sure, Hezbollah could continue the confrontation for many weeks, if not months. It has lots of money, mostly from Tehran, and thousands of unemployed youths to man street barricades for $2 a day.
>>
The opposition's call for a formation of a unity government, or early general elections, cannot be seen as a desire to 'destroy; Siniora's coalition. Hezbollah has been consistently reiterating its view that no one power can rule Lebanon alone. It is far too early to cast judgement on the results of Hezbollah's efforts.
It is also disingenuous to say that Hezbollah seeks to get the army involved in the violence. It has repeatedly called on its followers to abide by the army's orders. It is the pro-government factions that have called on the army to forcibly confront the demonstrators and remove them from the streets. The army command has come under criticism from Siniora's allies that is not doing its duty, and that it is siding with the opposition. This dangerous characterization of the army's actions encourages their supporters to view the army as partisan, and a legitimate target.
>>Hezbollah is also using President Emil Lahoud, the man installed and sustained by the Syrians as Lebanon’s head of state, as an irritant against Siniora. Using his constitutional powers, the usurper refuses to sign government edicts, thus paralyzing segments of the administration.
>>
>>Such a strategy, however, is sure to end in defeat and humiliation. To avoid that, Hezbollah may be forced to do what it has always vowed not to do: Turn its arms against other Lebanese communities. And that could mean another civil war in which Hezbollah may score early victories, but would have little chance of winning in the end. The idea that the major Western powers and their regional Arab allies would allow Lebanon to become an Islamic republic led by Hezbollah, and that against the wishes of a majority of the Lebanese, is simply fanciful.
>>
Hezbollah's political evolution clearly shows its abandonment of its initial goals, at its conception, to build an Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Its political line for the past decade has been to stress Lebanon's multi-sectarian character and its desire for Lebanon to be ruled by consensus, a not by any one domineering sect. To insist on the issue of the Islamic Republic is to dismiss the legitimate political concerns of the opposition.
Hezbollah has consistently refused to employ its arms in its political battles. It is clear that they understand, as any objective observer does, that a descent to civil is no one's interest. However, some of Siniora's allies have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the security services in Lebanon and have been explicitly calling on their followers confront opposition supporters. It would some not all people agree that civil war would be a bad idea.
>>The only sane way out of the crisis is a grand compromise among the Lebanese communities. Such a compromise could be built on these principles:
>>
>>— Lebanon should not become involved in any war unless it is directly attacked,
>>
>>— The current coalition government should be enlarged with the return of the Shiite parties and the inclusion of Aounites, in preparation for general elections within six months,
>>
>>— Emil Lahoud should resign as president and be replaced by an interim head of state chosen by the Parliament.
>>
>>— The international community should provide an aid package to keep the Lebanese economy afloat until the political situation is stabilized.
>>
>>Lebanon is teetering on the edge of the abyss. But it could still step back.
>>
The above would not be viewed as a compromise, but actually would be taken by the opposition as a clear victory in achieving its demands. Siniora and his allies clearly do not want early elections, and would not want to elect simply an 'interim' president. They are very keen on using their current parliamentary majority in order to elect a president who enjoys the full 6 year term. So long as early elections do not take place, they are very much content to wait out Lahoud's remaining 9 months.
It is also naive to think that the current crisis has been perpetuated due to a lack of a solution. A solution to the Lebanese problem exists and its details have been covered extensively. The problem lies in the regional confrontation between Iran and the U.S. Unless these two powers reach a compromise, Lebanon is doomed to be living with conflict.
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